📃Buffett's 2023 shareholder letter, 巴菲特2023股东信(ChatGPT翻译)

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Feb 26, 2023

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buffett2023

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Published

Shareholder Letter 2023

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.

A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.

Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.

The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.

Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours?

What we do

Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.

In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.

Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public.

Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”

One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.

Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.

At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management, most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)

Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.

The Secret Sauce

In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400 million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was $1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.

The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was $75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to $704 million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.

American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost $1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from $41 million to $302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.

These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at $25 billion while Amex was recorded at $22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.

Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its $1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged $80 million or so of annual income.

The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom. Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.

The Past Year in Brief

Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:

The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.

A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.

Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.

A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.

The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.

Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?

When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).

Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own. And that is a promise we can make.

Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.

That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.

58 Years - and a Few Figures

In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.

And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.

Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.

Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.

In aggregate, the 500 earned $1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned $3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.

At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.

In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the $3 billion mark noted above ($5.9 billion at BNSF and $4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500. All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.

As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.

At Berkshire, there will be no finish line.

Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes

During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about $32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent $43.9 trillion.

Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.

The $32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (341⁄2%), corporate income tax payments (81⁄2%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was $32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.

And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.

Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:

If you convert $1 million into newly-printed $100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.

Perform the same exercise with $1 billion – this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about 3⁄4 of a mile into the sky.

Finally, imagine piling up $32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.

When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”

At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.

I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.

Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner

Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.

Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:

The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.

If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.

All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.

If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.

Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.

You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.

Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.

A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.

Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.

Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.

There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.

You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich. • You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.

Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.

Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”

And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.

I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.

A Family Gathering in Omaha

Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.

From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?

I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle.

On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 61⁄2 of the 91⁄2 operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.

Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up $400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.

Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.

February 25, 2023 Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board

翻译版本 via. ChatGPT

致 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 的股东们：

我和我的长期合作伙伴查理·芒格担负着管理大量个人储蓄的任务。我们非常感激这些人对我们的持久信任，这种关系往往跨越他们的大部分成年生活。正是这些专注于储蓄的人在我写这封信时占据了我的思考前沿。

一种普遍的观点是，人们在年轻时选择储蓄，期望在退休后能够维持他们的生活水平。这种理论认为，死后留下的任何资产通常会留给他们的家人，或者可能会留给朋友和慈善事业。

我们的经验不同。我们认为Berkshire的个人持有者主要属于一次储蓄，永远储蓄的类型。尽管这些人生活得很好，但他们最终将大部分资金捐赠给慈善组织。这些组织又通过支出将这些资金重新分配给许多与最初的捐赠者无关的人，以改善他们的生活。有时，结果是非常惊人的。

金钱的运用能够揭示人性。我和查理非常高兴地看到Berkshire所产生的大量资金流向公共需求，同时也看到我们的股东很少选择显摆性的资产和王朝建设。

有谁不会喜欢为我们这样的股东工作呢？

我们做什么

我和查理将你们在伯克希尔的储蓄分配给两种相关的所有权形式。首先，我们投资于我们控制的企业，通常是购买100%的股份。伯克希尔指导这些子公司的资本配置，并选择每天做出运营决策的首席执行官。在管理大企业时，信任和规则都是必不可少的。伯克希尔强调前者到了非同寻常的（有人可能会说是极端的）程度。失望是不可避免的。我们对商业错误是有理解的；我们对个人不端行为的容忍度为零。

在我们的第二类所有权中，我们通过购买公开交易的股票被动地拥有企业的一部分。持有这些投资，我们在企业的管理方面没有发言权。

我们在这两种所有权形式中的目标是在具有长期有利的经济特征和值得信赖的管理者的企业中进行有意义的投资。特别需要注意的是，我们拥有公开交易的股票是基于我们对它们长期的业务表现的预期，而不是因为我们认为它们是巧妙买卖的工具。这一点至关重要：查理和我不是股票挑选者，我们是企业挑选者。

多年来，我犯了很多错误。因此，我们目前广泛收集的企业包括少数具有非常特殊的经济条件的企业，许多享有非常好的经济特征的企业，以及一大群处于边缘的企业。在这个过程中，我投资的其他企业已经倒闭了，它们的产品被公众所不需要。

资本主义有两个方面：这个系统在同时提供了更多的改进商品和服务的时候也创造了越来越多的失败者。熊彼特称这种现象为“创造性破坏”。

我们公开交易部门的一个优点是，偶尔可以以极好的价格购买到极好的企业的股票。至关重要的是要了解，股票通常以真正愚蠢的价格进行交易，无论是高还是低。“有效”的市场只存在于教科书中。事实上，可交易的股票和债券是令人困惑的，它们的行为通常只有在事后才能理解。

而控制性企业则是不同的一类。它们有时的价格比正常价格高得离谱，但几乎从不以低于合理估值的价格出售。除非受到压力，否则控制性企业的所有者不会考虑以恐慌类型的价格出售。

现在，适当给大家做一份报告：在58年的伯克希尔管理期间，我大部分的资本配置决策都不比一般的好。在某些情况下，我的错误决策也被极大量的运气所拯救。（还记得我们从美国航空和萨洛门免于近乎灭顶之灾的事件吗？我当然记得了。）

我们令人满意的成果是大约十几个真正好的决策的产物——这大概是每五年一个——以及有时被忽视的优势，这种优势有利于伯克希尔这样的长期投资者。让我们看看幕后发生了什么。

秘制调味料

在1994年8月——没错，是1994年——伯克希尔完成了对可口可乐公司四亿股股份的七年收购。总成本为13亿美元——那时的一笔非常有意义的资金投入。

我们从可口可乐获得的现金股息在1994年为7500万美元。到2022年，这一数额已经增长到7.04亿美元。每年都会有增长，就像生日一样。查理和我需要做的就是兑现可口可乐每个季度的股息支票。我们相信这些支票极有可能会增长。

美国运通的情况也基本相同。伯克希尔对美国运通的购买基本上是在1995年完成的，而且巧合的是也花费了13亿美元。这项投资所获得的年度股息从4100万美元增长到了3.02亿美元。这些支票也似乎极有可能会增长。

尽管这些股息增长令人愉悦，但远非引人瞩目。但它们带来的股价增长是非常重要的。年底时，我们对可口可乐的投资价值为250亿美元，而美国运通则记录在22亿美元。每个持有现在约占伯克希尔净值的5%，类似于很久以前的权重。

假设，暂且想象一下，我在1990年代犯了一个同样规模的投资错误，它平稳地保持着2022年的13亿美元价值。（比如一张高质量的30年期债券。）这项令人失望的投资现在只代表伯克希尔净值的0.3%，并且每年仍会给我们带来大约8千万美元的收入，但并没有增长。

给投资者的教训：随着花朵的绽放，杂草逐渐消失。随着时间的推移，只需要几个胜利者就足以创造奇迹。是的，从早期开始，并且活到90多岁也有助于此。

过去五十年一瞥

2022年是伯克希尔的一个好年头。公司的经营收益（我们用的是“GAAP”会计准则计算的收入，不包括股权持有的资本收益或损失）创下了308亿美元的纪录。查理和我关注这个经营数字，也建议你们这样做。未经我们调整的GAAP数字在每个报告日期都会疯狂地反弹和变幻。请注意其在2022年的杂技表现，这在任何方面都不是不寻常的：

当季度或甚至年度查看时，GAAP收益率是100％误导性的。毫无疑问，过去几十年中，资本收益对伯克希尔非常重要，我们预计它们在未来几十年将有重要的正面作用。但它们每个季度的波动，经常被媒体盲目地放在头条，会完全误导投资者。

去年伯克希尔的第二个积极发展是我们收购了Alleghany Corporation，一个由乔·布兰登担任船长的财产意外伤害保险公司。我以前曾和乔一起工作过，他对伯克希尔和保险都很了解。Alleghany对我们提供了特殊的价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使其保险子公司能够遵循其他竞争对手无法使用的有价值和持久的投资策略。

在Alleghany的帮助下，我们的保险浮动资金在2022年从1470亿美元增加到1640亿美元。通过纪律严明的核保，这些资金有很大的机会随着时间的推移而变得无成本。自1967年购买我们的第一家财产意外伤害保险公司以来，伯克希尔的浮动资金已经通过收购、运营和创新增长了8000倍。虽然在我们的财务报表中没有体现，但这个浮动资金对于伯克希尔来说是一个非常重要的资产。新股东可以通过阅读我们每年更新的浮动资金说明书（见A-2页）来了解其价值。

2022年，伯克希尔公司的每股内在价值仅略有增长，其中包括我们在伯克希尔公司、苹果和美国运通的类似举措。在伯克希尔公司，我们通过回购公司已发行股份的1.2％直接增加了您对我们独特的企业集合的利益。在苹果和美国运通，回购行动在不花费我们任何费用的情况下略微增加了伯克希尔公司的持股比例。

数学上并不复杂：当股数下降时，您在我们的许多企业中的利益将增加。如果回购价格有利于增值，每一个小幅的增长都会有所帮助。同样地，当公司为回购支付过高价格时，持续股东将会受到损失。这时，收益只流向出售股份的股东以及推荐这种愚蠢购买的昂贵投资银行家。

应该强调的是，增值回购带来的收益将在各个方面惠及所有股东。请想象一下，有三个完全了解当地汽车经销商情况的股东，其中一人负责经营。进一步想象，其中一名被动股东希望以一个对两个继续股东有吸引力的价格将自己的股份卖回给公司。完成后，这个交易会伤害任何人吗？经理是否比继续被动股东得到优惠？公众是否受到了伤害？

这句话的意思是，当有人告诉你所有的股票回购都对股东或国家有害，或者对CEO特别有利时，你正在听一个经济文盲或一个能言善辩的煽动者（这两个特点并不是互相排斥的）。

几乎无休止的细节关于Berkshire 2022年的运营情况都在K-33至K-66页中详细阐述。Charlie和我，以及许多Berkshire的股东，都喜欢详细阅读这一章节中列出的许多事实和数字。但是这些页面不是必须阅读的。有许多百万富翁和亿万富翁从未研究过我们的财务数据。他们只是知道Charlie和我以及我们的家人和亲密朋友继续在Berkshire有非常重要的投资，他们相信我们会像对待自己的资金一样对待他们的资金。

而且这是我们可以作出的承诺。

最后，有一个重要的警告：即使我们倾向于采用的运营盈利数字也很容易被希望这样做的管理层操纵。这种篡改通常被CEO、董事和他们的顾问视为高级技巧。记者和分析师也接受了其存在。打败“预期”被誉为管理上的胜利。

该活动令人作呕。操纵数字不需要任何才能：只需要有欺骗的强烈愿望。“大胆的想象会计”是一位首席执行官向我描述他的欺骗时使用的词汇，它已经成为资本主义的耻辱之一。

58年和一些数字

1965年，伯克希尔是一家只有一个生意的公司，拥有一个古老但注定失败的新英格兰纺织品业务。由于这个业务已经走向没落，伯克希尔需要一个立即的新起点。回过头来看，我当时对它的问题意识到得有点慢。

然后，一次幸运的机会出现了：国家保险公司在1967年出售，我们将资源转向了保险和其他非纺织品业务。

从那时起，我们开始了通往2023年的旅程，这是一条崎岖的道路，涉及了业主持续储蓄（即他们保留收益）、复利的力量、我们避免犯大错误的能力，以及最重要的，美国的顺风顺水。没有伯克希尔，美国也会好好的。反过来则不一定成立。

伯克希尔现在拥有一系列规模巨大、多元化的企业的重要股权。首先我们来看在纳斯达克、纽约证交所及其它相关场所日常交易的约5,000家上市公司。其中包括S&P 500指数成员，是一个由大型知名美国公司组成的精英集合。

在2021年，这500家公司共赚取了1.8万亿美元。由于我还没有最终的2022年数据，因此使用2021年的数据，只有128家公司（包括伯克希尔自身）赚取了30亿美元或更多，而23家公司亏损。

截至2022年年底，伯克希尔是其中八家巨头公司的最大股东：美国运通、美国银行、雪佛龙、可口可乐、惠普、穆迪、美洲石油和百胜环球。

除了这八个投资组合，Berkshire 还拥有 BNSF 的 100％和 BH Energy 的92％，每个的收益都超过了上述 30 亿美元的标准（BNSF 的收益为 59 亿美元，BHE 的收益为 43 亿美元）。如果这些公司公开上市，它们将取代目前 500 成员中的两个。总的来说，我们控制和非控制的十个庞然大物使得 Berkshire 比任何其他美国公司更广泛地与国家的经济未来保持一致（此计算不考虑养老基金和投资公司等 "受托人 "运营）。此外，尽管 Berkshire 的保险业务通过许多单独管理的子公司进行，但其价值与 BNSF 或 BHE 相当。

对于未来，伯克希尔公司将始终持有大量现金和美国国债，以及广泛的业务。我们还将避免可能导致在不便的时候出现任何不舒适的现金需求的行为，包括金融恐慌和史无前例的保险亏损。我们的CEO将永远是首席风险官-这是一个不可推卸的任务。此外，我们未来的CEO将用自己的钱购买伯克希尔公司股票，并将其净资产的一部分投入其中。是的，我们的股东将继续通过留存盈余而获得积累财富。

在伯克希尔公司，不会有终点线。

一些关于联邦税的惊人现实

在截至2021年的十年间，美国财政部税收约为32.3万亿美元，支出则为43.9万亿美元。

虽然经济学家、政客和大众对这种巨大的不平衡后果有各自的看法，但查理和我却认为对短期经济和市场的预测毫无用处，因此我们承认自己无知。我们的工作是以能够长期实现可接受的业绩并在金融恐慌或全球性严重经济衰退时保护公司无与伦比的持久力为目标，来管理伯克希尔的运营和财务。伯克希尔还提供一些缓解通货膨胀的保护，但这种属性并不完美。巨大而根深蒂固的财政赤字会产生后果。

在这十年中，财政部收入的32万亿美元来自个人所得税（48%）、社会保障及相关收入（34.5%）、公司所得税支付（8.5%）和各种次要的税款。伯克希尔通过公司所得税缴纳了320亿美元，几乎恰好占财政部所有收入的千分之一。

这意味着 - 准备好 - 如果美国有大约1,000个纳税人与伯克希尔支付的金额相匹配，其他任何企业或全国1.31亿个家庭都不需要向联邦政府支付任何税款。一分钱也不用交。

百万，亿，万亿 - 我们都知道这些词，但涉及的金额几乎无法理解。让我们将数字用物理尺寸来表示：

如果你将100万美元转换成新印刷的100美元钞票，你会得到一堆堆高达你的胸部高度。

如果你用同样的方式将10亿美元转换，这会变得更加令人兴奋！那么，这个堆会高达大约3/4英里的高度。

最后，想象一下堆积320亿美元，这是Berkshire在2012-21年联邦所得税中的总支付额。现在，这个堆的高度超过21英里，大约是商业飞机巡航高度的三倍。

当涉及到联邦税时，拥有Berkshire股份的个人可以明确表示“我在办公室中付款了”。

在Berkshire，我们希望并期望在未来十年内支付更多的税款。我们欠这个国家：美国的活力为Berkshire取得的任何成功作出了巨大的贡献，Berkshire将永远需要这种贡献。我们依靠美国的顺风车，尽管它有时会受到阻碍，但它的推动力总是会回来的。

我已经投资了80年了——超过我们国家寿命的三分之一。尽管我们的公民倾向于——几乎是热情——进行自我批评和自我怀疑，但我从未见过一个时机是合理的，可以长期押注美国失败。我非常怀疑，本信的任何读者在未来会有不同的经历。

没有什么事比有用一个好同伴更重要

查理和我想法很相似。但是我需要一页纸来解释，而他只需要一个句子就能概括。此外，他的版本总是更清晰地推理和更巧妙——有些人可能会补充说，更加直率地表达。

以下是他的一些想法，很多摘自最近的一期播客：

世界上充满了愚蠢的赌徒，他们不会像耐心的投资者那样做得好。

如果你看不清世界的本来面目，那就像是透过扭曲的镜头来判断一件事情。

我只想知道我会在哪里死，这样我就永远不会去那里。并且一个相关的想法：早期写下你希望被人如何评价——然后相应地行事。

如果你不在意自己是否理性，你就不会努力实现它。然后你会保持不理性，并获得糟糕的结果。

耐心是可以学习的。拥有长时间的注意力和集中精力在一件事情上的能力是一个巨大的优势。

你可以从死去的人身上学到很多东西。阅读你钦佩和鄙视的人的作品。

如果你能游到一个适航的船上，不要逃离正在下沉的船。

一个伟大的公司会在你离开后继续运转；一个平庸的公司无法做到这一点。

沃伦和我不关注市场的泡沫。我们寻找好的长期投资，并顽固地持有它们很长时间。

本·格雷厄姆曾说：“短期来看，股市是一台投票机；长期来看，它是一台称重机。”如果你一直让一件事物更有价值，那么一些聪明的人就会注意到并开始购买。

在投资时，没有什么是100%确定的。因此，使用杠杆是危险的。一连串的美妙数字乘以零总会等于零。不要指望两次发财。

然而，你不需要拥有很多东西才能变得富有。

如果你想成为一名伟大的投资者，你必须不断学习。当世界发生变化时，你必须改变。

Warren和我几十年来一直不喜欢铁路股票，但世界发生了变化，最终该国拥有了四个对美国经济至关重要的大型铁路公司。我们很慢才认识到这一变化，但迟到总比不到好。

最后，我想加上Charlie的两个简短句子，这些句子几十年来一直是他的决策定论：“Warren，再多考虑一下”。“你很聪明，但我是对的”。

这就是现状。我从来没有与 Charlie 通电话而没有学到什么东西。虽然他让我思考，但也让我发笑。

我会在 Charlie 的建议上加上一条自己的规则：找一个非常聪明、优秀的伙伴——最好比你略大一些——然后仔细听取他的意见。

聚集在奥马哈的一个大家庭

Charlie和我无耻得很。去年，我们在三年来的第一次股东聚会上，像往常一样大肆宣传。

从开场铃声开始，我们就直接针对你的钱包下手。很快，我们的See's小卖部就卖出了11吨有营养的花生太妃糖和巧克力。在我们的P.T. Barnum式的推销中，我们向你承诺长寿。毕竟，还有什么比See's的糖果更能解释Charlie和我活到99岁和92岁呢？

我知道你迫不及待地想知道去年的推销具体情况。

周五，门从中午一直开到下午5点，我们的糖果柜台销售了2,690笔单独的销售。周六，在我们的电影和问答环节限制商业交通的6.5小时中，See's在上午7点到下午4:30之间完成了另外3,931笔交易。

做个简单的数学运算：See's在其主要营业时间每分钟能够售出约10份产品（两天内销售额达到了40万美元），所有销售都在同一地点完成，售出的产品在101年间并没有发生实质性变化。亨利·福特推出的T型车时期适用的商业模式在今天仍然适用。

Charlie、我和整个Berkshire团队都期待着在5月5日至6日与你在奥马哈见面。我们会度过美好的时光，你也会有所收获。

25 二月 2023 沃伦·E·巴菲特

伯克希尔主席